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Michael S Knoll
I.

Introduction

Competitiveness has been called a dangerous obsession.1 It is certainly an obsession.2
Around the world, competitiveness considerations frequently inform policy and the law.
One place where this obsession is evident is in the tax laws. Governments often find it
hard to reject claims from their constituents that local businesses are at a competitive
disadvantage relative to foreign firms. Frequently, the claim is made that tax laws are
one – if not the leading source – of a lack of competitiveness. Often, the response has
been to amend the tax laws with the goal of improving the competitiveness of domestic
firms. There is much evidence for that practice in U.S. tax law.
For example, the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act was aimed at eliminating
a perceived tax advantage enjoyed by Japanese investors who purchased U.S. real estate
at “fire sale” prices in the late 1970’s. A similar concern with a perceived tax-induced
disadvantage in competitiveness motivated the 1986 branch profit tax provisions and the
1989 earning stripping limitations. More recently, even the names that Congress gives to
its tax bills, such as the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, evidence Congress’s
intention to use the tax system to improve U.S. competitiveness.3
One impetus for that concern is the increasingly important role played by cross-border
transactions in the U.S. economy. In 1960, international trade in goods represented 6
percent of gross domestic product (GDP). In 2006, it accounted for 20 percent of GDP.4
In 1960, annual cross-border investment flows represented 1 percent of GDP. In 2006, it
was 18 percent of GDP. By 2006, the aggregate ownership of foreign capital by U.S.
investors and of U.S. capital by foreign investors totaled $26 trillion – about two years’
GDP. Given the large size and dramatic growth in cross-border capital flows, it is no
wonder that there is such widespread interest in the impact taxes can have on U.S.
competitiveness.5
Yet, in spite of the persistent claims that the U.S. tax laws are handicapping domestic
companies and the government’s recurrent attempts to use the tax laws to improve the
competitive position of domestic firms, little academic attention has been given to the
1

Paul Krugman, Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 28.
See Samuel Brittan, ‘Competitiveness’ Rears Its Ugly Head FIN. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, at 11.
3
See Reuven Avi-Yonah, All of a Peace Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S. International Taxation, 25
VA. TAX. REV. 313, 334 (2005).
4
Trade in services, which was not counted in 1960, represented another 5 percent of GDP.
5
See Office of Tax Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Approaches to Improve the Competitiveness
of the U.S. Business Tax System for the 21st Century 2 (Dec. 20, 2007).
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connection between competitiveness and taxes. There are several reasons for that
inattention. First, many economists are uncomfortable with the idea of competitiveness,
which is not a well defined concept in economics, and so eschew writing about it.
Second, international economists are mostly interested in the welfare implication of
various, alternative tax policies, and it is possible to talk about welfare without using the
language of competitiveness.
Accordingly, this essay is an attempt to begin to fill that gap by improving our
understanding of how taxes affect competitiveness.6 In this essay, I develop a simple
model to illustrate how various tax policy decisions can affect international
competitiveness. I, then, apply that model to various provisions in the U.S. Internal
Revenue Code.7 However, before any of that, I provide a definition for competitiveness.

II.

What is Meant by Competitiveness

What is meant by competitiveness? It is not a term that economists traditionally use.8
Economists often speak of efficiency, or comparative advantage, or more narrowly of (an
advantage in) marginal production costs or the cost of capital, but rarely do they speak of
competitiveness. Yet the press, the public and policymakers regularly use the language
of competitiveness.
In recent years, a few economists have begun writing about competitiveness.9 And one
conclusion that is clear from that work is that there is no single universally accepted
definition of competitiveness. Because it has never been defined rigorously in the
economic literature, the term “competitiveness” is an ambiguous concept that has been
given many different meanings.10 Frequently, the term “competitiveness” is applied at
the macroeconomic level in order to make statements about whole nations.11 For
example, the World Economic Forum and Institute of Management Development
(WEF/IMD) annually publish their World Competitiveness Index.12 Like all such
indexes, the World Competitiveness Index summarizes a range of indicators into a single
number. Such a number is a weighted average of all the factors that go into the index.
Of course, with any such method, the choice of weights is suspect. More fundamentally,
6

This essay is part of a larger project on taxes and competitiveness. The first paper in that series is
Michael S. Knoll, Taxes and Competitiveness (Univ. of Penn., Inst. for Law & Econ. Research, Paper No.
06-28, 2006), and is available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=953074. The second
paper in that series is Michael S. Knoll, The UBIT: Leveling an Uneven Playing Field or Tilting a Level
One? 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 857 (2007).
7
Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the U.S. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended (“IRC”).
8
See Brittan, supra note [2].
9
For a thoughtful review of the literature on competitiveness, with an emphasis on the various different
definitions employed in the literature, see Eckhard Siggel, International Competitiveness and Comparative
Advantage: A Survey and a Proposal for Measurement, 6 J. INDUS. COMPET. TRADE 137, 140-48 (2006).
10
Id. at 140.
11
Id. at 141-42.
12
The most recent WEF/IMD Global Competitiveness Report, with Index, is for 2007-2008, and is
available at http://www.gcr.weforum.org/.
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is the absence of a theoretical basis for the choice of factors. Other scholars attempt to
measure the competitiveness of nations by their real exchange rates (or real effective
exchange rates).13 Such methods measure the deviation from purchasing power parity.
Accordingly, such measures of competitiveness are better indicators of the extent of
distortions in the currency markets than they are of anything on the real side of the
economy. As such, they are a poor choice for modeling the impact of tax policy on
competitiveness.14
In contrast with macroeconomic concepts of competitiveness, microeconomic concepts
focus on producers competing in product markets. Microeconomic measures of
competitiveness include delivered market price, total cost in domestic prices,15 marginal
and average cost of production, unit labor cost,16 and market share.17 Microeconomic
definitions have several advantages over macroeconomic definitions. First, because they
apply to industries or firms, rather than to whole economies, microeconomic measures
are more closely aligned with our intuitions about competitiveness. Second,
microeconomic measures are capable of being given a more solid theoretical foundation
because they can be integrated into standard economic models.
There is a wide variety of microeconomic indicators of competitiveness. That diversity is
in part a response to widespread and divergent demand for such information. The
principal users of broad macroeconomic indexes, such as the WEF/IMD World
Competitiveness Index, are investors and lenders. They use the index to help them make
decisions about investments and loans, to set hurdle rates and loan rates, to decide where
to allocate their money, and to assess the risk of their portfolios. In contrast,
microeconomic indicators are generally developed with an eye towards government
policy. Governments regularly take action under the rubrics of trade policy, industrial
policy and tax policy. Such actions affect both domestic companies and foreign
companies and are frequently informed by considerations of competitiveness. That is
clearly the case with tax policy. Accordingly, any definition of competitiveness that will
be useful for evaluating tax policy must have the potential to be affected by tax policy.
In the fields of antitrust and industrial organization, competitiveness is sometimes
conceptualized in terms of the minimum price that a competitor is willing to charge. A
13

E.g., Leslie Lipschitz & Donogh McDonald, Real Exchange Rates and Competitiveness: A Clarification
of Concepts, and Some Measurements for Europe (IMF, Working Paper No. 91/25, 1991), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=884671; Ian W. Marsh & Stephen Tokarick, Competitiveness Indicators: A
Theoretical and Empirical Assessment (IMF, Working Paper No. 94/29, 1994), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=883467.
14
Siggel, supra note [9] at 151-52.
15
See id. at 150-53.
16
See INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY & COMPETITIVENESS 3-10 (Bert G. Hickman ed., 1992) (providing
an overview on productivity and competitiveness); Anthony G. Turner & Stephen S. Golub, Towards a
System of Unit Labor Cost-Based Competitiveness Indicators for Advanced, Developing and Transition
Countries (IMF, Working Paper No. 97/151, 1997), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=882726 (Staff
studies for the World Economic Outlook).
17
Ousmane J. Mandeng, International Competitiveness and Specialization, 45 CEPAL REV. 39-52 (1991);
Paul Krugman & George N. Hatsopolous, The Problem of Competitiveness in U.S. Manufacturing, NEW
ENG. ECON. REV. Jan. 1987, at 18.
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seller, thus, is more competitive if it can sell a product for less than its competitors.
Various cost-type definitions of competitiveness include the following: revealed
comparative advantage,18 domestic resource cost,19 unit labor cost,20 full unit cost,21
relative unit labor cost,22 and total unit labor cost at domestic prices.23
There is much to say on behalf of such cost-based definitions of competitiveness. They
are inconsistent with many of our intuitions. They also match up well with antitrust law
and industrial organization views of competitiveness, which focus on price competition
and view cost as one of the key determinants of price.
There are, however, also problems with any cost-based definition of competitiveness.
First, we do not have a convincing theory of competition over prices. Although there are
theories of competition in imperfect markets, none of those theories does a convincing
job of capturing reality. Accordingly, any attempt to develop a theory of how taxes affect
competitiveness by affecting prices is problematic since we do not have a good theory of
competition among parties with different costs. Second, taxes are likely to impact costs
both directly and indirectly in a variety of ways. Disentangling the various indirect
effects of taxes upon costs and prices is likely to be very complicated.
Accordingly, I will use a different, but closely related definition. I define
competitiveness in terms of the maximum price that a competitor will bid for an asset
(the “candidate investment”). Thus, the higher that value, the more competitive is a
party.24 This definition is consistent with many of our intuitions.25 For example, the
lower are other costs of production, the higher one is willing to bid for a scare and
necessary input. It also captures some real world economic activity. For example, it does
an especially good job of capturing one vivid form of competition – when companies
compete to purchase existing assets or an extant firm. It also applies more generally
because anyone who owns assets can – and often will – sell those assets if there is
someone who values those assets more highly. In addition, defining competitiveness in
terms of the maximum bid price is relatively easy to model.
In order to focus on how taxes affect competition, I assume that in the absence of taxes
all competitors would value the investment at the same amount. That is to say, I assume
that all competitors would earn the same cash flow from a given investment and have the
same cost of capital.26 I make that assumption not because it accurately describes the real
18

Bela Balassa, Trade Liberalization and “Revealed” Comparative Advantage, 33 MANCHESTER SCH. 99
(1965).
19
Michael Bruno, Domestic Resource Cost and Effective Protection: Clarification and Synthesis, 80 J.
POLITICAL ECON. 16 (1972).
20
See International Productivity & Competitiveness, supra note [16].
21
Eckhard Siggel & John Cockburn, International Competitiveness and Its Sources: A Method of
Development Policy Analysis (Concordia Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Discussion Paper No. 9517, 1995).
22
Turner & Golub, supra note [16].
23
Siggel & Cockburn, supra note [21].
24
Cf. Mitchell A. Kane, Ownership Neutrality, Ownership Distortions, and International Tax Welfare
Benchmarks, 26 VA. TAX REV. 53 (2006).
25
See Knoll, supra note [6].
26
Assuming the cash flow is the same, the cost of capital for that investment will usually be the same.
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world (firms are not all equally efficient), but in order to isolate the consequences of
different tax treatments. Accordingly, if there is a difference in valuation, it must be a
result of taxes.
Following that approach, I define a competitively neutral tax system as one where equally
efficient competitors place the same value on the candidate investment. More generally,
a competitively neutral tax system is one where the tax system does not change relative
bid prices across potential investors. Accordingly, tax considerations can affect
competitiveness when they cause relative bid prices to change.27
Tax neutrality is likely to have substantial welfare benefits. As economists have
recognized for some time, the identity of the party who owns an asset – and especially
who controls an asset –can affect how that asset is used. Thus, when ownership and
control are not in the hands of the party that can best use an asset, there is a costly
distortion and welfare is not at a maximum.28

III.

Firms as Conduits

Much of the recent attention being paid to competitiveness focuses on the
competitiveness of multinational corporations (MNCs) and of domestic competitors to
foreign MNCs. One important feature of firms is that they do not have a fixed quantity of
capital to invest. Instead, firms are conduits. They pool money from people who have it
and they invest that money in various projects.29
Because firms are conduits, there are two sets of tax consequences from an investment by
a firm. First, there are tax consequences on the investment side. Second, there are tax
consequences on the financing side. The latter includes the tax consequences to the firm
of its financing choices. It also includes any tax imposed on the investors.
Understanding the impact of taxes on competitiveness requires an examination of both
the investment and financing sides. Expressed somewhat differently, a proper

27

There are some similarities between competitiveness neutrality and capital ownership neutrality (CON).
The latter idea is closely associated with Desai and Hines. E.g., Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr.,
Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 487 (2003). There are also significant differences
between competitiveness neutrality and CON. The most salient difference is that competitiveness
neutrality is not being offered as a normative benchmark. Accordingly, my emphasis is on the conditions
necessary to achieve competitiveness neutrality, and not on whether a competitively neutral tax system
should be a goal of cross border tax systems. I take it as a given that states are concerned with the
competitiveness of their local firms and are interested in understanding how tax systems affect that
competitiveness. A second difference is that competitiveness recognizes that there are other ways to
exercise control over an asset without owning the asset. Another difference is that competitiveness applies
to both firms and investors, as developed by Desai & Hines CON ignores firms and applies to the ultimate
beneficial owners. In addition, I arrive at different conclusions than Desai & Hines and Kane for the
conditions under which either competitiveness neutrality or CON will be achieved.
28
For discussions of some of the welfare costs from distorting ownership patterns, see Desai & Hines,
supra note [27]; Kane, supra note [24], and Knoll, Taxes and Competitiveness, supra note [6].
29
See Kane, supra note [24].
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examination of the impact of taxes on competitiveness requires consideration of the tax
consequences for the firm and for investors in the firm.
In this essay, I look at how taxes affect competitiveness of both firms and investors.30
Although I look at both firms and their investors, the focus is on competitiveness at the
level of the firm. That is because most of the efficiency benefits from owning and
controlling assets are likely to arise at the firm level. The benefits are likely smaller at
the investor level. Even so, I also look at the effect of taxes on competitiveness at the
investor level. I do this for several reasons. First, some investments are made directly by
individuals, not through firms. Second, there can be efficiency costs from distortions in
direct ownership, especially when such investments provide some measure of control.31
Third, individual investors can suffer a welfare loss in the form of bearing nonsystematic
risk when tax consideration cause them to avoid the securities of corporations from other
countries.32

IV.

Territorial and Worldwide Taxation

In this Part, I develop a model of how taxes affect the international competitiveness of
firms and investors. The focus in this Part is on the broadest questions of tax policy.
Specifically, I look to see whether territorial or worldwide tax systems can be
competitively neutral. A territorial tax system taxes each taxpayer only at the source.
Income earned in one country is not taxed in any other country. Thus, with a territorial
tax system, investment income is taxed at the rate applied in the source jurisdiction to
local investments. In contrast, with a worldwide tax system, income is taxed both in the
country where it is earned and in the country where the taxpayer resides. To prevent
double taxation, the country of residence grants a foreign tax credit to its taxpayer for the
taxes it pays to foreign governments on foreign-source income. In theory, a worldwide
tax system requires an unlimited foreign tax credit.33 With contemporaneous taxation at
home and abroad, and an unlimited foreign tax credit, the effect of worldwide taxation is
to tax the investor at his residence country tax rate on any investment.34
Throughout this essay, I use a simple example with three countries: A, B and C. Assume
that the rate of return on riskless, alternative assets (the “benchmark asset”) in a world
30

In this essay, I do not look at home taxes affects the competitiveness, the salaries or productivity of those
who work. See generally Office of Tax Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury, supra note [5] at 1
(referring to the competitiveness of U.S. workers). Those issues are important, but beyond the scope of this
current essay.
31
Many private equity firms claim that they have expertise in improving underperforming businesses. If
so, that would be an example where the identity of the investors – at least of the fund manager rather than
the passive financial investors – mattered.
32
See Mihir Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Taxes, Institutions and Foreign Diversification
Opportunities (May 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=986322.
33
A country with an unlimited foreign tax credit will refund taxes on domestic income if the source country
tax on foreign income exceeds the residence country tax on that income. No country offers a truly
unlimited foreign tax credit.
34
Throughout this essay, I largely ignore the possibility of deferring residence country taxation with a
worldwide tax system.
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without taxes is 10 percent.35 In the absence of taxes, the rate of return is the same
everywhere regardless of where an asset is located or its holder resides. In such a world,
consider a simple, one-period, riskless direct investment.36 The project, which is located
in Country B, will pay $1100 in one year (the “candidate investment”).
Assume that competition for the candidate investment occurs across firms located in the
three countries.37 Each company operates by raising capital from outside the firm and
investing that capital. Equally efficient firms from the three countries compete for the
candidate investment. Thus, each firm will earn the same $1100 from the investment
with the same inputs. The candidate investment, which is sold through an auction, is
acquired by the firm that places the highest value on it.
Using the assumptions given above, each firm will be able to raise the capital to
undertake the candidate investment by going out into the marketplace and paying a 10
percent return. Thus, each firm will discount the cash flows from the project using a 10
percent hurdle rate. Accordingly, each firm will be willing to pay up to $1000 for the
candidate investment.38 Because in a world without taxes no company values the
candidate investment more than another, any difference in a world with taxes must be due
to taxes.

A.

Territorial Taxation

Now introduce the possibility of taxes. Assume that there are three countries and each
country imposes an income tax. The three countries, however, have different (flat) tax
rates. Country A imposes tax at a rate of 25 percent, Country B at 40 percent, and
Country C at 50 percent. Initially, assume that all countries have territorial tax systems.
Assume further that investors from Country B set market interest rates everywhere. Let
the before-tax interest rate in Country B be 10 percent. Thus, the after-tax return in
Country B will be 6 percent.
Throughout this essay, I assume that capital is highly mobile globally. Because of that
mobility, the after-tax return in a world where every country has a territorial tax system
will be equal everywhere. Hence, the before-tax return will be 8 percent in Country A
and 12 percent in Country C. That yields an after-tax return of 6 percent for investments
in Countries A and C as well. Thus, the after-tax return is equal everywhere at 6 percent,
but the before-tax return varies across countries with their national tax rates. That is
illustrated in Table 1.
35

The idea of a benchmark asset is that additional funds can be readily invested in such an asset.
Accordingly, the after-tax return on alternative assets will tend to move towards the after-tax rate on the
benchmark asset.
36
I use a riskless investment throughout this essay in order to keep the example simple so as not to bury the
intuition.
37
In a world without taxes, the value that competitors place on the candidate investment will be
independent of the nature of the competition. Specifically, when there are no taxes the value will be the
same whether the competition is among individuals or firms.
38
The value of the candidate investment to any firm is calculated as $1000 = $1100/1.1.
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Table 1
Territorial Taxation
Before- and After-Tax Rates of Return in Each Country
Country A
Country B
Country C
Tax Rate
25%
40%
50%
Before-Tax Return
8%
10%
12%
After-Tax Return
6%
6%
6%
Consider first the possibility that competition for the candidate investment is across
firms, but that the firms are not taxable entities. All entities, including corporations, are
subject to pass-through tax treatment: all items of revenue, expense, basis or credit pass
through the entity to the investor. That includes the source of any item. Thus, all
investors are taxed as if each one earned his proportionate share of the firm’s income.
From a tax perspective, that is equivalent to assuming that that the competition occurs
across individuals, not firms.
Because the market for capital is global, a company based in one country can raise capital
from investors in any country and can invest that capital in any country.39 The candidate
investment is located in Country B and all income generated by the candidate investment
will be taxed in Country B as Country B source income. Because the tax system of every
country is assumed to be territorial, no other country will tax that income, and so the tax
rates in other countries do not affect the cash flow from the candidate investment.40
Thus, regardless of who finances the candidate investment, and irrespective of through
which country the investment is channeled, the candidate investment will be subject to
tax at the 40 percent tax rate imposed by Country B.
Consider three investors – one located in each country. With global adoption of a
territorial tax system, each investor earns an after-tax return of 6 percent at home and in
every other country. Thus, in country B where all income from the candidate investment
is sourced and subject to tax at 40 percent, each investor must earn 10 percent before tax
in order to earn 6 percent after tax. Thus, firms can raise the capital to undertake
investment from individuals from every country by paying them a 10 percent before-tax
return. Accordingly, the value of the candidate investment is $1000 to any firm
regardless of its residence (or the residence of its investors). 41 That is shown in Table 2.
39

The assumption that there is a global capital market implies that there is no advantage in either raising
capital locally or investing capital locally.
40
If sales from products or services produced from using that asset occur elsewhere, then there is income
from another country that is taxed at the proper rate for that country. Because that rate applies regardless of
where the company is based, there is no impact on competitiveness, which is a relative concept not an
absolute one, because all competitors are affected in the same way.
41
The present value of the candidate investment, $1000, is calculated as follows. Let the investment’s
present value be V. If the investor purchases the candidate investment (through a firm) for V, he will
receive $1100 in one year. Upon realization, the investor will pay tax at 40 percent on his gain of ($1100V). Denote the personal tax rate by t. Thus, the investor’s tax is ($1100-V)t. And so the amount
remaining after payment of tax is $1100(1-t) – Vt. Denote the required after-tax return by r, the investor
must receive (1+r)V in one year. Equilibrium, thus, requires that (1+r)V = $1100(1-t) + Vt. Rearranging
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Table 2
Territorial Taxation
Individual Income Sourced at Candidate Investment’s Location
Value of Candidate Investment in Country B to Firms Located in Each Country
Country A
Country B
Country C
42
Tax
40%
40%
40%
Value
$1000 = $1060/1.06 $1000 = $1060/1.06 $1000 = $1060/1.06
It, thus, follows that global adoption of a territorial tax system leads to competitiveness
neutrality when businesses are not themselves taxed, but are instead treated as passthrough entities. Moreover, such neutrality can be achieved with different tax rates
across countries. Thus, in the example, there is competitiveness neutrality at both the
firm and investor levels in spite of each country assessing tax at a different rate.
Assume now that firms are taxed separately from the individuals who invest in them.
Moreover, as in the classical corporate tax system used in the United States, assume there
are two levels of taxation – both the corporation and individual investors in the
corporation are taxed. To keep the arithmetic simple, I assume that individual and
corporate tax rates are flat and equal in each country. Thus, in Country A, both the
individual tax rate and the corporate tax rate are 25 percent. Similarly, in Country C,
both the individual and corporate tax rates are 50 percent. Finally, in Country B, which is
still considered to set global market prices, the individual and corporate tax rates are 40
percent.
I further assume that projects undertaken by corporations are only feasible to undertake
through corporations. That is to say, corporations compete only against other
corporations and not against individuals for projects.43 In addition, although I assume
that Country B is the price setter for global markets, I assume that each country’s
corporate market is dominated by domestic corporations. Thus, in each country, the
before-tax rate of return on corporate investments is just sufficient to provide local
investors with an after-tax return of 6 percent. 44 The following table gives the

terms and solving for V yields V= $1100(1-t)/(1+r-t). Substituting 6 percent for r and 40 percent for t
yields V=$1100(.6)/(.66)=$1000.
42
The row labeled ‘Tax’ gives the tax rate that applies to the investment. Because the investment takes
place in Country B where the tax rate is 40 percent and because the tax system is territorial, all investors
(regardless of their country of residence) will pay tax at 40 percent on their income from the project. Thus,
the tax rate in each column is 40 percent.
43
Because investments through corporations are taxed more heavily than those made directly by
individuals, tax considerations lead corporations to abandon those investments individuals can undertake to
individual investors in favor of those investments that are not feasible for individuals to make for reasons
other than tax.
44
Throughout this essay, I assume that the marginal source of equity funds is new shares. That is often
referred to as the “old” view of dividends. In contrast, the “new” view assumes that the marginal source of
investment funds is exclusively retained earnings. The latter view, also called the “trapped equity” view,
typically implies that market values for assets held in corporations are below replacement cost. In this
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equilibrium before-tax rate of rate, which is also the hurdle rate for new investment, for
corporations based in each country. The hurdle rate is the before-tax return a corporate
investment must earn in each country in order to provide shareholders with a 6 percent
return after paying both corporate and personal taxes.
Table 3
Territorial Taxation
Before- and After-Tax Rates of Return for Corporate Investments in Each Country
Country A
Country B
Country C
Personal Tax Rate
25%
40%
50%
Corporate Tax Rate 25%
40%
50%
Before-Tax Return
10.67%
16.67%
24%
As is clear from Table 3, the hurdle rate in each country is an increasing function of that
country’s tax rates. The higher are local tax rates, the higher will be the return on
corporate investments at the margin. In equilibrium, then, corporate investments in
Country A will earn 10.67 percent, in Country B, 16.67 percent, and in Country C, 24
percent.
Consider now the possibility that corporations from different countries are competing for
a candidate investment in Country B. If a territorial tax system taxes both individual
equityholders and corporate investors in Country B where the project is located, then all
investors who are indirect owners of the candidate investment would be subject to two
levels of tax at 40 percent. That is equivalent to an effective tax rate of 64 percent45 and
so all firms and all individual investors would value the project at $943.46 In effect, the
only difference in results when individuals make the investment either directly or
indirectly through firms that are not separately taxed and when individuals invest through
separately taxed corporations is the effective tax rate in Country B. It is now 64 percent
instead of 40 percent. That is not, however, how territorial tax systems currently operate.
The individual investors in a corporation are not taxed as if the source of their income is
the same as the source of the corporation’s income. In other words, source does not pass
through to the investor when corporations are separately taxed..

essay, I do not examine how taxes impact the competitiveness of corporations located in different
jurisdictions assuming that the “new” view is accurate.
45
The effective tax rate of 64 percent is calculated as follows: 1-(1-.4)(1-.4)=.64.
46
The present value of the candidate investment, $943, is calculated as follows. If the investor purchases
the candidate investment (through a firm) for V, its present value, he will receive $1100 in one year. Upon
realization, the firm will pay tax at 40 percent on its gain, ($1100-V). Denote the corporate tax rate by T.
Thus, the corporate tax is ($1100-V)T. And so the amount remaining after payment of corporate tax is
$1100(1-T) – VT. The personal tax, assessed at rate t, on the amount remaining after payment of the
corporate tax is $1100(1-T)t-VTt + Vt. Thus, the amount remaining after the payment of all taxes is
$1100-($1100-V)(T+t-Tt). Because the required after-tax return is r, the investor must receive (1+r)V in
one year. Equilibrium, thus, requires that (1+r)V = $1100-($1100-V)(T+t-Tt). Rearranging terms and
solving for V yields V= $1100(1-T-t+Tt)/(1+r-T-t+Tt). Substituting 6 percent for r and 40 percent for T
and t yields V=$1100(.36)/(.42)=$943.
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Instead, the individual investor has income from holding shares in a corporation. The
source of that income does not generally depend upon where the corporation earned that
income. Instead, it depends upon where the corporation is located and where the
individual resides.47 Assume then – as is the current U.S. source rule for dividends – that
the individual investor’s income is sourced where the corporation is located. That
income is then taxed at the local tax rate in the country where the corporation is located.
The resulting tax rates that apply to investments made through corporations in each
country and the maximum amount that corporations based in each country would be
willing to bid for the candidate investment are given in the following table.
Table 4
Territorial Taxation
Individual Income Sourced at Corporation’s Location
Value Placed on Candidate Investment for Corporations Located in Each Country
Country A
Country B
Country C
Personal Tax Rate
25%
40%
50%
Corporate Tax Rate 40%
40%
40%
Value
$971
$943
$917
As is clear from a quick perusal of Table 4, the candidate investment is worth the most to
corporations based in Country A and the least to corporations based in Country C.48 The
reason is also clear from Table 4. The personal tax rate paid by investors depends upon
where the corporation through which they invest is based – it does not depend upon
where the investor resides or the real investment is made. Thus, the personal tax can be
thought of as a differential toll charge for using different corporations. The toll charge is
lowest for corporations located in Country A – only 25 percent – and highest for those
located in Country C – 50 percent. In such circumstances, the tax system is not
competitively neutral with respect to firms. Instead, corporations based in Country A
have a tax-induced advantage and those based in Country C have a tax-induced
disadvantage.49
As for the individual investors, the tax system does not encourage or discourage investors
from any country. Because such investors pay personal tax at the rate imposed by the
country in which the corporation through which they invest is located, they are all willing
to offer capital at an after-tax return of 6 percent. Thus, because the total tax is lower
when the investment in country B is made through a firm based in Country A, the tax
system encourages investors from all countries to invest through firms located in Country
A

47

Where the corporation is located can be a simple matter of where it is incorporated or a complicated
facts-and-circumstances determination. Throughout this essay, I assume that a corporation’s location is
clear.
48
The values in Table 4 can be calculated using the formula for present value in note [46] supra and
substituting into that formula the values for the personal and corporate tax rate in Table 4.
49
In many cases, the toll charge is in the form of a dividend withholding tax.
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The discussion above – including the calculations in Table 4 – assumed that the
individual investors were taxed on the personal level at the individual tax rate of the
country where the corporation through which they invest is located. There is an
alternative under current law. The investors might be taxed where they reside. If, for
example, the investors’ incomes were capital gains instead of dividends, that income
under current U.S. law would be sourced where the investor resides, not where the
corporation is located.50 Accordingly, such income would be taxed at the tax rate where
the investor resides. Assuming that Country B continues to set market prices, Country A
investors will want to invest in such equities (because they earn 7.5 percent, not 6
percent) and Country C investors will want to avoid them (because they earn 5 percent,
not 6 percent). In such circumstances, there is not competitiveness neutrality with respect
to individual investors. Tax considerations will affect who will be the beneficial or
indirect owners of corporate investments. The most likely owners of such securities will
be the residents of low-taxed countries because those investors will get the benefit of
their low personal home tax rate on investments in foreign securities. However, investors
are indifferent to where the corporation in which they invest is located. That is because
the corporation’s location does not affect the individual investor’s tax liability. The
resulting valuations for the candidate investment are given in the following table.

Table 5
Territorial Taxation
Individual Income Sourced at Investor’s Residence
Value Placed on Candidate Investment for Corporations Located in Each Country
Country A
Country B
Country C
51
Personal Tax Rate
40%
40%
40%
Corporate Tax Rate 40%
40%
40%
Value
$943
$943
$943
As can be seen from Table 5, the tax system is competitively neutral with respect to the
corporations that directly compete for the candidate investment. No corporation is
advantaged or disadvantaged relative to its peers based on its location because of taxes.
(In other words, there are no differential taxes based on the corporation’s location.) That
is because corporations are all taxed based on where the real investment occurs and
individuals are all taxed based on where they reside. There is, then, no toll charge based
on where the firm is located and so the competitiveness of firms is not affected by where
they are located. However, in such a system, the beneficial ownership of investments
made through corporations is not competitively neutral. Investors located in low-tax
50

If the investment is through a derivative – such as a swap – the current U.S. rule is that the income is
sourced at the residence of the investor. The connection between the tax rules for derivatives (especially
the sourcing rules) and competitiveness warrants further attention.
51
At the margin, the individual tax rate is 40 percent because investors from Country B are assumed to set
market prices. Investors from Country A receive a windfall (an after-tax return of 7.5 percent – 1.5 percent
more than they can earn elsewhere) because they are the tax clientele for such investments. Any Country C
investors who invest in corporations have a shortfall (an after-tax return of 5 percent – 1.5 percent less than
they can earn elsewhere).
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jurisdictions have an advantage in investing through corporations whereas those that live
in high-tax jurisdictions are at a disadvantage.
In summary, a territorial tax system is competitively neutral with respect to both firms
and investors when firms are not taxed separately from their investors, but are instead
treated for tax purposes as pass-through entities that pass all tax attributes, including
source, through to their investors. In contrast, when firms are taxed separately, and the
source of the firm’s income is not passed through to the investors in the firm, then a pure
territorial tax system will not be competitively neutral with respect to either or both firms
and investors. If investors’ incomes are sourced where the firms are located (e.g.,
dividends), then the tax system is competitively neutral with respect to individual
investors, but not with respect to firms. In that event, firms located in jurisdictions with a
low personal tax rate will have a tax-induced advantage over firms located in
jurisdictions with a high personal tax rate. Alternatively, if investors’ incomes are
sourced where they reside (e.g., capital gains52), then the tax system is competitively
neutral with respect to firms, but not with respect to individuals. Those individuals who
reside in low-tax jurisdictions will enjoy windfalls when they invest in corporate equities,
whereas those individuals who reside in high-tax jurisdictions will experience shortfalls.

B.

Worldwide Taxation

Assume now that all countries adopt worldwide taxation with unlimited foreign tax
credits. In that case, equilibrium requires that the before-tax rate of return in each
country is the same. Assume that the before-tax rate of return on noncorporate
investments is 10 percent everywhere – the before-tax return in country B with a
territorial tax system53 Investors in Country B will earn 6 percent at home, as with a
territorial tax system. They will also earn 6 percent everywhere else. For example, a
one-year investment in Country A will earn 10 percent before tax. The investor will pay
tax on that return at 25 percent to Country A. With a worldwide tax system, the investor
from Country B will report the entire 10 percent before-tax return to Country B, which
implies a total tax liability of 40 percent on that income. The investor receives a credit
equal to 25 percent of that income for the tax paid to Country A, and so the investor owes
an additional tax to the tax authorities in Country B equal to 15 percent of the total
before-tax return earned in Country A. That yields a total tax liability of 40 percent on
that income, which leaves the investor with an after-tax return of 6 percent on that
investment.
Consider a similar investment in Country C. The investor from Country B pays 50
percent tax to the government of Country C. The investor reports the full 10 percent
before-tax return to Country B, which yields a tax liability of 40 percent. The investor
gets a credit of 50 percent of the before-tax return and so receives a refund equal to 10
percent of the before-tax income earned in Country B (or an offset to other taxes) from
52

Also, ownership through derivatives gives residence source income.
That was not the case with territorial taxation. With territorial taxation, the after-tax return was 6
percent everywhere.

53
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the tax authorities of Country B. Thus, the investor’s net tax liability is again 40 percent
and so the after-tax return is again 6 percent. In other words, the Country B investor
earns 6 percent after tax wherever it invests.
In contrast, consider an investor from Country A. An investor from Country A will also
earn 10 percent on a one-year investment in A. However, such an investor will pay only
the 25 percent Country A tax. Thus, such an investor will be left with an after-tax return
of 7.5 percent. If that investor makes a similar investment in Country B or Country C,
the after-tax return is again 7.5 percent. The higher tax in Countries B and C is offset by
tax credit refunds from Country A. The result is similar for an investor located in
Country C, except the after-tax return is smaller. It is only 5 percent. See Table 6.
Table 6
Worldwide Taxation
Before- and After-Tax Rates of Return for Investor’s from Each Country
Country A
Country B
Country C
Tax Rate
25%
40%
50%
Before-Tax Return
10%
10%
10%
After-Tax Return
7.5%
6%
5%
As before, I assume that competition for the candidate investment, which is assumed to
be located in country B, is among equally efficient business entities located in the three
different countries. Once again, these entities compete for that investment by raising
funds in a global capital market and by bidding for the right to acquire the investment.54
First, consider the possibility that the business entities are not themselves taxed. Instead,
the firms are taxed as pass-through entities with all tax consequences (including gross
income and the tax paid) passed through to the investors. In that case, because the
entities are untaxed, each entity is willing to pay up to 10 percent – the entire gross return
– to outside investors in order to obtain the funds to make the investment. That 10
percent rate of return is also the discount rate that each firm will use in evaluating the
candidate investment. Thus, each firm will be willing to bid up to $1000 for the
investment, as in the following table.
Table 7
Worldwide Taxation
Value of Candidate Investment in Country B to Firms Located in Each Country
Country A
Country B
Country C
Value
$1000 = $1100/1.1
$1000 = $1100/1.1
$1000 = $1100/1.1

54

The discussion below assumes that the candidate investment is taxed in the same manner as an
investment made with marginal funds. Differentially taxed assets can produce clientele effects and thus
interfere with competitive neutrality in a worldwide tax system. Those problems, however, can be avoided
if the foreign tax credit applies to implicit as well as explicit taxes. See Knoll, Taxes and Competitiveness,
supra note [6].
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Moreover, all investors will be willing to advance funds to any firm, regardless of where
it is based, in order to fund the investment at 10 percent. That is because each investor’s
ultimate tax rate on any investment is a function solely of where that taxpayer resides and
does not depend on the location of the investment or the conduit.55
Thus, as with a territorial tax system, global adoption of a worldwide tax system is
competitively neutral when firms are not taxed directly and the investors are taxed on a
pass-through basis. In those circumstances, the different tax rates in each country do not
affect the competition to acquire the candidate investment. In effect, the tax rate in the
country where the company is located is irrelevant. It does not affect the after-tax cash
flow from the candidate investment, and so it does not influence which company will
acquire the candidate investment.
Second, consider the possibility that the entities themselves are taxed. That is a realistic
assumption for large domestic firms and MNCs, which are usually taxed as Subchapter C
corporations or their equivalent. As long as the investor includes the entire before-tax
income of the project in income and gets credit for the taxes paid to Country B and any
taxes paid to the country where the corporate intermediary is located, then the investor is
still willing to accept a 10 percent before-tax return. The corporation will, therefore, use
a 10 percent discount rate and so the project is still worth $1000 to all companies. In
effect, the firm does not pay taxes inasmuch as the investor’s total tax liability, including
taxes paid by the firm on his behalf is determined by the investor’s home country tax rate.
Because that tax rate is invariant with respect to the location of the entity through which
the investment is made, all entities are equally competitive. Thus, once again, as long as
all tax paid directly by the investor or indirectly by the firm on behalf of the investor is
credited to the investor by his country of residence, a worldwide tax system (with an
unlimited foreign tax credit) is competitively neutral even with corporate taxes and
different tax rates across countries.56
That neutrality, however, breaks down once the tax treatment of the investor is separated
from that of the corporation. If the tax paid by the corporation is not fully credited by the
investor’s home country, then the tax system will not be competitively neutral. Thus,
continue to assume that there has been global adoption of a worldwide tax system, but
now assume that the investor in the corporation does not get credit for the tax paid by the
corporation. 57 Instead, the investor gets credit only for the taxes that the investor pays to
the country through which the investment is made. The most common form of such a tax
would be a dividend withholding tax.

55

Each investor’s after-tax return is as in Table 6 regardless of where the firm through which the
investment is made is located.
56
I thank Richard Frensch for pointing this out to me.
57
This is how the U.S. tax system works unless the investor is a U.S. corporation that owns at least 10
percent of a foreign corporation that pays a dividend. In that case, the U.S. corporation includes the foreign
tax paid by the foreign corporation in income and receives a foreign tax credit. This is sometimes called
the “indirect” or “deemed paid” foreign credit. See IRC Sections 78 (including tax paid by foreign
corporation within dividend) and 902 (extending foreign tax credit to deemed paid taxes.)
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Such dividend withholding taxes do not threaten competitiveness neutrality in a world in
which every country has adopted worldwide taxation as long as those taxes are fully
creditable. In such a regime, it is the non-creditable taxes imposed at the corporate level
that prevent competitiveness neutrality. That can be seen through the example.
Assume that a corporate level tax at the corporate level tax is imposed by the country
where the corporation through which the investment is made is located. Also, assume
that the country in which the investor resides imposes an individual level tax. The
investor level tax is invariant with respect to the location of the corporation through
which the investment is made, but the corporate level tax is not. Recall that I have
assumed that investor- and corporate-level tax rates in each country are the same
(although such rates differ across countries). Thus, the corporate and personal tax rates in
Country A are both 25 percent. Similarly, those rates are 40 percent in Country B and 50
percent in Country C. Accordingly, an investor from Country A who invests through a
corporation resident in Country B will pay personal tax at a rate of 25 percent and
corporate tax at a rate of 40 percent. In the example, I assume corporate investments will
return 10 percent after payment of the corporate tax, but before payment of the individual
tax.58
I further assume that the corporate market in each country is dominated by corporations
from that country. Thus, corporate investments in Country B will yield 16.7 percent.
Similarly, corporate investments in Country A will yield 13.3 percent, while those in
Country C will yield 20 percent.59
Consider a candidate investment in Country B that companies from all 3 countries are
vying to purchase. Assuming every country has a worldwide corporate tax system with
unlimited foreign tax credits, then each company’s hurdle rate for such an investment is
its before corporate tax return given above. Such a return ensures that the investors will
earn 10 percent after paying corporate tax (and before paying individual tax). The
corresponding values for the candidate investment to corporations located in the three
different countries are given in Table 8.
Table 8
Worldwide Taxation
Value of Candidate Investment in Country B to Firms Located in Each Country
Country A
Country B
Country C
Corporate Tax Rate 25%
40%
50%
Value
$971
$943
$917
As is clear from Table 8, the candidate investment is worth different amounts to different
firms depending upon where each firm is located. The candidate investment is worth the
most to firms located in Country A and the least to firms located in Country C. The
intuition is that the corporate tax operates as a toll charge that investors incur when they
58

The only investments made through corporations are investments that are not feasible for individuals to
make directly.
59
The equilibrium returns on corporate investments in each country are given in Table 3.
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invest in the candidate investment. That toll charge differs depending upon the location
of the corporation through which the investment is made.
Although a worldwide tax system with an unlimited foreign tax credit is not
competitively neutral with respect to firms, it is competitively neutral with respect to
investors. Because investors are taxed at their home country tax rate regardless of the
location of the firm in which they invest, all investors are willing to invest in corporate
equities so long as they earn a 10 percent return.60
The analysis above assumed that all countries provided unlimited foreign tax credits. If
the credit is limited and calculated separately for each country, then investments through
a firm resident in Country A will incur a 40 percent corporate tax rate, not 25 percent.
Such firms will, therefore, only be willing to bid up to $943 – the same amount as firms
located in Country B. As for firms in Country C, because their home country tax is
higher than the tax in Country B, their taxes and bid prices are unchanged. Thus, they
will still be at a tax-induced competitiveness disadvantage.
Another possibility is that each country permits cross crediting of foreign tax credits.
That is to say, it allows the income earned in one country to be offset by the tax credits
earned in another country. Thus, if a corporation has excess tax credits, it can use those
credits to reduce the tax on the investment. In the extreme, the tax on a foreign
investment can be reduced for an investor with excess credits to the tax collected by the
source country. Thus, if a corporation resident in Country C has excess foreign tax
credits,61 it might be able to reduce the tax on the candidate investment to just the tax
collected by Country B – 40 percent. Thus, cross crediting can raise the bid price of such
an excess credit firm located in Country C for the candidate investment to $943. Having
excess credits will not help a firm based in a lower-tax country. Thus, if the Country A
firm had excess foreign tax credits, it would still value the candidate investment at $943 –
the value it places on the candidate investment with a limited foreign tax credit that does
not permit cross crediting.
Alternatively, a company might have foreign income on which it is paying home country
tax. Such companies are said to be excess income. When a country that is excess income
earns income abroad that is taxed at a rate higher than its home country tax rate, then the
taxes that it pays abroad on such incremental income might be offset dollar-for-dollar by
reductions in taxes paid to the home country government. In the extreme, a new
investment in a high-tax country can go completely untaxed because the tax paid to the
foreign government is fully offset by a reduction in taxes collected by the home country
government. Accordingly, assume that the companies in Countries A and C have foreign
income on which they are paying home country tax.62 The value of the candidate
60

The conclusion that taxes do not affect the choices by investors of which firms to invest breaks down if
the foreign tax credit is limited. Investors would then avoid firms based in high-tax jurisdictions.
61
In order to have excess credits, the Country C firm would have to have earned income in a country with a
higher tax rate than its home country tax rate. In the example, that would require additional countries with
a tax rate above 50 percent.
62
That would require the company resident in Country A earn foreign income in a jurisdiction with a
lower tax rate than that imposed by Country A.
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investment to a company that is excess income can be as high as $1000.63 As the
example makes clear, cross crediting can – but does not always – provide a company with
an advantage in competitiveness relative to other firms, from the same or different
countries.64 However, cross crediting will not render a worldwide tax system
competitively neutral at the firm level.
In summary, a worldwide tax system is competitively neutral with respect to both firms
and individual investors when firms are not taxed, but are instead treated as pass-through
entities that attribute all income and credit all taxes to the ultimate investors. In such
circumstances, neutrality requires an unlimited foreign tax credit. However, a worldwide
tax system (even with an unlimited foreign tax credit) is not competitively neutral with
respect to firms when the income earned by the corporation and the taxes it paid are not
attributed and credited to the ultimate investors. In order for such a tax system to be
competitively neutral, jurisdictions must harmonize their tax rates.65 If tax rates are not
harmonized, then those firms located in low-tax jurisdictions will have tax-induced
competitiveness advantages over the firms located in high-tax jurisdictions. However, a
worldwide tax system (with an unlimited foreign tax credit) is competitively neutral with
respect to individual investors.

C. Mixed and Other Possible Tax Systems
In this Section, I consider the impact on competitiveness of global adoption of other tax
systems besides pure territorial taxation (territorial taxation at both the firm and
individual level) and pure worldwide taxation (worldwide taxation at both the firm and
individual level).
1.

Worldwide for Passive Income and Territorial for Active Income

One criticism that is frequently leveled against territorial tax systems is that they allow
passive income to escape taxation because such income can be located anywhere and so it
can be given whatever source is most advantageous from a tax standpoint. Accordingly,
some countries that would be inclined towards adopting a territorial tax system employ a
worldwide system for passive income and a territorial system for active income. Such a
mixed system can be competitively neutral with respect to both firms and individuals, but
it requires certain conditions be met. What those conditions are depends upon whether
foreign equity holdings are treated as passive or active income, whether corporate income
is treated as passive or active income, and where such income is sourced.

63

The candidate investment will be worth $1000 to a firm with $1000 or more of excess foreign income
that is not offset by foreign tax credits. For such a firm, the $400 tax paid to Country B will be offset by
$400 of foreign tax credits.
64
The foreign tax credit position of a company located in Country B would not affect the value of the
candidate investment to such a firm because for such a firm the income from the candidate investment is
domestic income and no eligible for the foreign tax credit.
65
It will also require harmonization of various tax rules (such as depreciation schedules) in order to
equalize effective marginal tax rates.
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Consider first the tax treatment of corporate business income, which is likely to be taxed
as active income. If the source of that income is the corporation’s location, then the
corporate tax system will not be competitively neutral. In that case, each corporation will
impose a different toll charge based on its location. Alternatively, if the source of income
is where the investment occurs so that the taxing authority is the same regardless of the
location of the firm through which the investment occurs, then the corporate tax system
can be competitively neutral. That, however, depends upon how individual investors are
taxed.66
If foreign equity holding are treated as passive (and so are subject to worldwide taxation),
then the individual tax system is competitively neutral when there is an unlimited foreign
tax credit. If, instead, foreign equities are treated as active (and so are subject to
territorial taxation), then whether the individual tax system is competitively neutral
depends upon where that income is sourced. If that income is sourced where the
corporation resides, then the tax system is not competitively neutral. Companies located
in countries that impose high tax rates on such income will be at a competitive
disadvantage relative to those located in countries that impose low tax rates.
Alternatively, if the income from foreign equities is sourced where the investor resides,
then the individual tax system will be competitively neutral.
It, thus, follows that a territorial tax system for active income and a worldwide tax system
for passive income can be competitively neutral with respect to both firms and investors.
Such a mixed system must treat corporate business income as active and hence subject to
territorial taxation. It must also treat individual investors’ equity investments as passive
and hence subject to worldwide taxation. Finally, the foreign tax credit on that income
must be unlimited.67

2.

Formulary Apportionment

The fifty states that constitute the United States have separate income tax systems with
varying tax rates. However, within the United States, taxpayers do not attempt to
calculate their income earned within each state. Instead, corporate taxpayers calculate
their total U.S. income. They, then, allocate that income across states using a formula
based on assets, employees, and sales in each state. The allocation system, referred to as
formulary apportionment, avoids the necessity of determining transfer prices, which have
long been the bane of international taxation. Of course, similar issues of competitiveness
arise across states as across countries (although the tax rate differences are generally
smaller). Recently, a system of formulary apportionment has been proposed for use by
66

The above discussion assumed that all corporate income is active. However, to the extent that
corporations have passive income (and the taxes they pay are not eligible for a full credit by the investor’s
country of residence), then there is an advantage from investing through corporations that are located in
countries with a low corporate tax rate. That nonneutrality is similar to the effect from a pure worldwide
tax system.
67
Alternatively, the tax system can treat individuals’ incomes from equity securities as passive and subject
to territorial taxation, but only if the source of such income is where the investor resides. In that case, there
is no need for a foreign tax credit because the income from equities is already domestic source income.
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MNCs.68 Accordingly, this section considers the impact on competitiveness of a system
of formulary apportionment. To keep things manageable, I assume that there is no
individual level tax.69 That allows attention to focus on the corporation.
If the same formula is used everywhere, all corporate income will be taxed once and only
once. If jurisdictions use different formulas, some income might be taxed twice (or
more) and some income might escape tax. Obviously, if different jurisdictions use
different formulas, there is ample opportunity for nonneutrality. Consider, then, a system
where every jurisdiction uses the same formula. In that case, if the formula allocated all
of the income from the candidate investment to the country where the firm is located,
then the system would resemble worldwide corporate taxation. That would not be
competitively neutral because firms located in low-tax jurisdictions would have an
advantage over those located in high-tax jurisdictions.
Alternatively, if the formula allocated all of the income elsewhere, then the tax system
would resemble territorial taxation.70 It will be similar to territorial taxation in that
corporate income will be taxed once at a rate other than the rate in the country where the
firm is located.71 Thus, the tax paid on the candidate investment will be independent of
the tax rate in the country where the firm through which the investment is made is
located. We know from the discussion of territorial tax systems above, that the global
adoption of a territorial tax system is competitively neutral. Thus, a system of formulary
apportionment that allocated no portion of incremental investments to the corporation’s
home country can be competitively neutral. It obviously follows that if the formula
allocates a portion of the income from a new investment to the home of the firm and part
elsewhere, then the tax system will not be competitively neutral. More generally, the
more income that the formula allocates away from the home of the MNC, the closer the
tax system will come to being competitively neutral.
For many investments, the most likely result is that only a small portion of the income
will be allocated to the corporation’s home country – likely due to a small increase in
employment and the value of some intangible assets – but that most of the income will be
allocated elsewhere. Under those circumstances, formulary apportionment will not be
competitively neutral, but it likely will come close. That, in turn, implies that a system of

68

Reuven Avi-Yonah & Kimberly A. Clausing, A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment for
Corporate Income Taxation: The Hamilton Project (Univ. of Michigan Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper
No. 07-009, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=995202.
69
As described above, a worldwide tax system with an unlimited foreign tax credit will achieve
competitive neutrality at the individual level. Thus, I could assume a worldwide tax system for individuals
with a system of formulary apportionment for corporations and achieve the same qualitative results.
70
I assume that the allocation would be independent of the location of the parent company. Hence, if the
economics of the investment are the same with the only difference being the location of the company
through which the investment is made, then the tax consequences would be largely the same. There is still
some possibility for nonneutrality because the formula might allocate inframarginal income away from
their current location towards that of the new investment.
71
The manner in which the income is allocated among countries other than the residence country might
differ from a standard territorial tax system. In other words, the implicit source rules embedded in the
allocation formula might differ from a given set of source rules.
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formulary apportionment for corporations and worldwide taxation for individuals (with
an unlimited foreign tax credit) will likely come close to being competitively neutral.

D. Other Possible Structures
This section expands the analysis above to take into account two new elements of
possible transactional structures. Specifically, in this section, I look at the consequences
for competitiveness of corporations financing the acquisition of the candidate investment
through debt or a lease.
1.

Investment through Debt

In the discussion above, I assume that all investments take place through equity, which is
taxable at the corporate level. Many investments can be financed in whole or in part with
debt. Countries that have a classic corporate income tax allow interest on debt, but not
dividends or redemptions, to be deducted from income. Accordingly, because the income
from a debt-financed investment is not taxed at the corporate level, the corporate tax is
not assessed on debt-financed investments. In effect, debt is a means of avoiding the
corporate income tax on debt-financed income.
Whether the tax system is neutral with respect to debt-financed investments will depend
on the choice between worldwide and territorial taxation and the source rules. If all
countries adopt pure worldwide taxation, then the investor will be taxed at his home
country tax rate regardless of where the borrower is located or the investment takes place.
Similarly, the corporate borrower will be taxed at the corporate tax rate of the country in
which it is located on its net income from any investment. In such circumstances, a
worldwide tax system is competitively neutral with respect to 100-percent, debt-financed
investments.72 More generally, debt-financed investments tend to promote
competitiveness neutrality at the firm level by stripping income out of the corporation
and thus eliminating the toll charge based on the location of the corporation. That is to
say, with a worldwide tax system and a classical corporate income tax, debt financing
tends to promote competitiveness neutrality by converting the classical corporate tax
system into a pass-through regime. And we know from above, that a worldwide tax
system is competitively neutral when business entities are not separately taxed.
The analysis is more complicated if the tax system is purely territorial. For such
investments the effect of debt financing on competitiveness will depend on the source
rule for interest income. For the firm, the tax system is competitively neutral only if the
interest paid on the debt is sourced in the same country as the revenue generated by the
investment made possible by that debt.73 If the payee’s interest income is also sourced in
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Neutrality, however, will require either an unlimited foreign tax credit or a source rule that treated
interest as earned in the residence of the payee.
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Determining where the income generated by debt financing arises and hence where it is sourced for tax
rules is complicated and might be impractical. Tracing debt and interest does not tell you what investments
were economically financed by those funds.
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the country where the investment generates revenue, then the source rules will operate to
pass-through to the investor the income generated by the project funded by debt
financing. In that case, a territorial tax system will be competitively neutral with respect
to both the firm and the investor for 100-percent, debt-financed investments. More
generally, debt-financed investments tend to promote competitiveness neutrality at the
firm level by stripping income out of the corporation, thereby converting the classical
corporate income tax into a pass-through regime, and we know from above, that a
territorial tax system is competitively neutral when business entities are not separately
taxed. Conversely, if the investor’s interest is sourced at either the payor’s or payee’s
residence, then the tax system will not be competitively neutral with respect to the
investor.74 Competitiveness neutrality, then, would require a harmonization of tax rates
on interest income.
2.

Capital Leases

The discussion above has equated ownership with use. However, using an asset is not the
same as owning that asset. Competitiveness concerns focus on who uses, controls and is
exposed to the risk and rewards from an asset, and not simply on who holds title. Looked
at from the perspective of modern finance, ownership is just one method of controlling an
asset. There are others. One such substitute is a long-term lease, called a capital lease.
Like debt, capital leases tend to operate to remove from the firms that employ them the
income on the capital that finances those investments. Because lease payments are
deductible, the income generated by leased property is taxed directly to the capital
providers without any tax at the firm level. Capital leases tend to operate as pass-through
devices for both the firm and the corporate intermediary. Thus, with worldwide taxation,
income from lease financed property is taxed at the financier’s residence tax rate, which
promotes competitiveness neutrality. With territorial taxation, the result depends upon
the source rule. If the source is the residence of the lessee, then the arrangement
promotes competitiveness neutrality at the firm level, but not at the investor level.
Alternatively, if the source is where the lessor uses the property,75 then leasing tends to
promote competitiveness neutrality at both the investor and firm levels by eliminating
taxation based on where the corporation is located. 76
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The basic U.S. source rule for interest is that it is sourced where the payor resides or in the case of a
corporation where it is incorporated.
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The basic U.S. source rule is that lease payments are sourced where the property is used.
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Leasing is also an effective means of transferring the tax benefits (or disadvantages, if any) from
differentially taxed assets to the taxpayers who value those benefits the most (or who can at least cost incur
the disadvantages). Thus, for example, aircraft leases are widely used to transfer the tax benefits of
ownership, including accelerated depreciation, from tax-exempt, state-owned airlines and private airlines
without sufficient taxable income to high-bracket taxpayers who can use the tax benefits, but cannot use the
aircraft. Thus, leasing tends to ensure that the value of the tax benefits granted to various kinds of property
is equal across users with different tax situations by equalizing the dollar value of the tax benefits across
users, such techniques tend to promote competitiveness neutrality. See Knoll, supra note [4].
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V.

Application to U.S. Tax Law

This Part applies the analysis developed above to the U.S. tax laws that affect crossborder transactions. There are many, many provisions in the tax law that impact the
competitiveness of U.S. firms relative to their foreign competitors. In this Part, I briefly
discuss some of the provisions that have the most obvious and direct effects.
However, first, I address the question is the current international tax system competitively
neutral. There are several reasons to believe that the current system is not competitively
neutral. First, there is no broad consensus on cross-border tax systems. Countries have
adopted very different regimes with different economic consequences. Thus, there is no
reason to believe that the current hodgepodge of international tax systems results in a tax
system that is competitively neutral.
Second, if all countries adopted the current U.S. international tax system, but imposed
different rates, the tax system would still not satisfy competitiveness neutrality. There
are several aspects of the U.S. international tax system, if adopted globally, that would
interfere with competitiveness neutrality at either the firm or investor level. First, the
United States has a system of worldwide taxation for domestic corporations. If adopted
globally, that system would operate as a differential toll charge on investments through
corporations with different tax rates. Second, the United States does not provide an
unlimited foreign tax credit. Third, the United States does not attribute foreign corporate
income to the U.S. investors who are the beneficial owners of foreign corporations nor
does it credit the taxes paid by the foreign corporation to the beneficial owners. Thus, the
current U.S. international tax system is a poor model if the goal is achieving
competitiveness neutrality. A better model would be a mixed system that combines
territorial taxation of active income and worldwide taxation of passive income.
The rest of this Part looks at the current U.S. rules to determine how these provisions
affect the competitiveness of U.S. firms’ foreign operations. The analysis in this Part is
more tentative than above. That is because the comparison is across countries with
imperfect and often very different tax regimes. I first consider provisions that tend to
disadvantage U.S. firms competing abroad; I then consider provisions that tend to
advantage U.S. firms or mitigate their disadvantage.77 This is an area where much work
remains to be done.
First, the United States has a worldwide tax system for taxing U.S. based MNCs. A
worldwide tax system implies that U.S. businesses will pay the U.S. tax rate on foreign
investments. Because many countries do not have a worldwide corporate tax system the
United States’ adoption of a worldwide corporate tax system imposes an additional tax on
investments made through U.S. corporations that is not imposed on investments made
through other entities located elsewhere.
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As a baseline to which to draw a comparison, I assume other investors and firms are subject to
competitively neutral tax systems. I also assume U.S. investors and firms are price takers.
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Second, and closely related to the first, the United States has a higher statutory corporate
tax rate than do many other countries. Business groups make much of the high U.S.
corporate tax rate relative to other OECD countries. However, usually the mechanism for
that disadvantage is left unexplained. The analysis above suggests a specific mechanism.
A high U.S. corporate tax rate coupled with a worldwide tax system for corporations will
tend to disadvantage U.S.-based MNCs relative to their foreign competitors by raising the
former’s cost of capital for new equity relative to the latter’s. A higher cost of capital
will translate into a higher discount rate for new equity-financed investments. That
higher discount rate translates into a tax-induced disadvantage for U.S. MNCs.78 That
disadvantage is generally larger, the higher is the U.S. corporate tax rate relative to
foreign corporate tax rates.79
Third, the United States imposes a dividend withholding tax. Unless reduced by treaty,
the tax is a flat 30 percent. When not fully offset by foreign tax credits, the dividend
withholding tax operates as a toll charge on investing through U.S. firms and thereby
raises the tax cost to foreign investors of investing through U.S. businesses. The
dividend withholding tax, thus, raises the cost of capital for U.S. firms relative to that for
foreign firms from jurisdictions that do not impose dividend withholding or similar taxes.
Fourth, source rules differ across countries. Inconsistent source rules can cause some
kinds of income to be taxed more than once or not at all. Also, some source rules can
cause income to be taxed by the United States that might otherwise escape taxation. An
example of the latter is the tax source of interest. The United States considers the source
of interest income to be the residence of the payor. That means that interest paid by U.S.
firms is U.S. source income. Such income is, therefore, subject to taxation in the United
States. Unless it fell under the exemption for portfolio interest, that income would be
taxed at U.S. rates. That would raise the cost to U.S. firms of debt financing, which
would leave U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage in competition for assets that can be
financed indirectly through debt.
Fifth, the United States has a complex set of interest allocation rules. These rules
recognize that where an obligation to pay interest is sourced is often arbitrary. The
decision by an MNC through which subsidiary it borrows money usually has few, if any,
economic consequences, but that decision often has significant tax consequences.
Motivated by a desire to protect the tax base, the United States has adopted interest
allocation rules which determine how interest deductions will be allocated across borders.
The impact of these rules is often to shift interest payments away from the United States
and thus to increase U.S source income subject to the U.S. corporate tax. Thus, the effect
of such rules is to raise the tax cost of debt financing for U.S. MNCs. By raising the tax
cost of debt financing, the interest allocation rules raise the hurdle rate for investments
financed in whole or part with debt and thereby reduce the competitiveness of U.S.
MNCs.
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If other countries have territorial tax systems, then the effect is even greater.
When the U.S. tax rate is equal to or lower than the foreign tax rate, then there is generally no
disadvantage.
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Sixth, the United States has rules that purport to separate leases that will be respected
from leases that will not. In contrast with safe harbor leasing, which would treat as a
lease practically any transaction called a lease, the existing rules limit the amount of risk
that can be transferred from the lessor to the lessee. Because a capital lease is a technique
for integrating the corporate and personal income tax and transferring tax benefits, the
effect of the restriction is to increase the cost to U.S. firms of using leased assets in their
business.
There are also provisions in the U.S. tax law that tend to reduce the disadvantage of the
above provisions and possibly provide a competitiveness advantage in some
circumstances.
First, the U.S. income tax system allows deferral of U.S. tax on income earned abroad
and reinvested in active businesses. The effect of such deferral is to reduce the present
value of the U.S. tax on foreign income. Accordingly, such deferral tends to move the
U.S. international tax system away from a worldwide tax system and towards a territorial
tax system.
Second, the U.S. international tax system is further moved in the direction of a territorial
tax system by providing a reduction in taxes on repatriated dividends. The American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004 provided a temporary tax deduction for U.S.-based MNCs
repatriating accumulate earnings and profits from foreign subsidiaries.80 The granting of
a temporary reduction in the effective tax rate on foreign earnings will encourage U.S.
firms to wait for further reductions in the future.81
Third, the United States allows the cross crediting of foreign tax credits. The foreign tax
credit used to separate each country into a separate basket. Excess credits from one
country could not be credited against income from another country. Instead, such credits
would be deferred until such time as there was excess income from that same country. If
there never was such income, then the excess credits would never be used. When
Congress simplified operation of the foreign tax credit, one of the changes was to
eliminate separate baskets for each country. As a result, a company that has excess
credits from one country can use those credits to offset income from other countries. As
noted above, such cross crediting can reduce the hurdle rate for new investments by
allowing excess credits to be used. For an MNC with excess credits, it will have a taxinduced competitiveness advantage over competing firms in countries with low-tax rates.
Such an advantage might also exist relative to foreign firms. For an MNC with excess
income, it will have a tax-induced competitiveness advantage over competing firms in
countries with high tax rates. It will also have an advantage over competing foreign firms
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See IRC Sec. 422(a).
For thoughtful econometric studies of the consequences of the American Jobs Creation Act’s temporary
reduction in the effective tax rate on repatriated dividends, see Jennifer Blouin and Linda Krull, Bringing It
Home: A Study of the Incentives Surrounding the Repatriation of Foreign Earnings Under the American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (Sept. 21, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925348; Thomas
Brennan, Coming Home: Cash-Flow and Market Response to Repatriation, (May 27, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1134040.
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from countries with a worldwide tax system that do not permit cross crediting or even
those that use a territorial tax system.82

VI.

Conclusion

In this essay, I have tried to provide a systematic analysis of how global adoption of
different possible international tax regimes affects the competitiveness of firms located in
different countries and of investors in those firms. The main results are as follows: First,
when firms are not taxed separate and apart from the beneficial owners who invest
through them, but are instead treated as pass-through entities that pass all tax attributes
through to their owners (including the source of their income), then global adoption of
either a territorial or worldwide tax system can be competitively neutral with respect to
both individuals and firms. In such circumstances, there is no need to harmonize tax
rates to achieve competitiveness neutrality. However, a worldwide tax system must
provide unlimited foreign tax credits if it is to achieve competitiveness neutrality.83
Second, when corporations are taxed separately from their investors, global adoption of
either a pure territorial or pure worldwide tax system will not lead to competitiveness
neutrality with respect to both investors and firms. Depending on where the investor’s
income is sourced, pure territorial tax regimes will not be competitively neutral at the
firm level (payor sourced – dividends) or the investor level (payee sourced – capital
gains). In contrast, a pure worldwide tax regime is competitively neutral at the investor
level (assuming unlimited foreign tax credits), but not at the firm level (even with an
unlimited foreign tax credit).
Third, a mixed tax regime, similar to the one used today by many countries, that taxes
corporations on a territorial basis and individuals on a worldwide basis is competitively
neutral with respect to both firms and individuals. Such a tax regime is competitively
neutral without the need to harmonize either corporate or investor tax rates. However,
such neutrality requires that the worldwide component provide for an unlimited foreign
tax credit.84
Finally, when viewed at the level of the forest instead of the individual trees, the main
conclusion of this essay is that if we want to understand how taxes affect the incentives of
businesses to own assets located in various countries and for investors to invest in
different businesses, we need to combine an understanding of the economics of crossborder investments with a solid knowledge of how different tax regimes operate. As this
essay has shown, the tax consequences of different tax regimes, such as territorial and
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However, the advantage over firms that are resident in countries that use a territorial tax system assumes
that the firm already has other foreign investments. Before making any foreign investments, the expected
tax on foreign operations with a worldwide tax system with a limited foreign tax credit cannot be lower
than that on a territorial tax system.
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In addition, a worldwide tax system must deal with the problem caused by differentially taxed assets by
providing extending the foreign tax credit to include implicit taxes as well explicit taxes.
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An alternative to a worldwide tax system with an unlimited foreign tax credit is the adoption of source
rules that source the income from investments in corporate securities at the investor’s residence.
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worldwide taxation, critically depend upon whether firms are taxed separately or as passthrough entities, the operation of the source rules, and the structure of real world
transactions. There is a great deal of interest today in the impact the current international
tax system has on competitiveness and how to design a tax system to improve
competitiveness. 85 However, improving the competitiveness of firms and investors from
one nation relative to that of others has a beggar-thy-neighbor quality that invites
retaliation. Accordingly, there is the potential for large welfare gains from designing and
adopting an international tax system that is competitively neutral with respect to both
firms and investors. There is much work to be done in that enterprise, but the rewards
likely warrant the efforts.
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See Office of Tax Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury, supra note [5].
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